Privacy and the Right to Die by Peter J. Riga
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 26 
Number 2 Volume 26, Spring 1981, Number 2 Article 2 
September 2017 
Privacy and the Right to Die 
Peter J. Riga 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peter J. Riga (1981) "Privacy and the Right to Die," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 26 : No. 2 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol26/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
PRIVACY AND THE
RIGHT TO DIE
PETER J. RIGA*
Literature relating to the ethical, psychiatric and legal aspects of eu-
thanasia, already voluminous, continues to grow. It is important for law-
yers to be prepared for the arguments which will arise from these core
questions, so that they may effectively lead society through reasoned ar-
guments, rather than naked emotion, to solutions which will respect the
rights of all concerned. The interests of doctors, hospitals, patients, next
of kin and the state must be developed and defined before the application
of law may be made. The present context of the arguments concerning
the "right to die" and privacy must be examined, therefore, before con-
crete cases may be analyzed.
I. THE COMMON LAW
At common law, one who assisted another in committing suicide,
whether by furnishing the means to do so or otherwise, was guilty of mur-
der.' Today, while no American jurisdiction considers suicide a crime,
every modern legal system labels euthanasia as criminal.' Few punish eu-
thanasia as severely as the Anglo-American system. This emphasis was
due to the influence of Christianity, which regarded life as sacred and
inalienable. The criminal law reflected this philosophy, defining murder
as the killing of another human being with malice aforethought "no mat-
ter how kindly the motive."'8 As long as the killing is done with malice, a
term which denotes the intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm, the
crime is murder. The California Supreme Court has observed that "one
* Ph.L., 1954, M.A., 1960, Louvain University, Belgium; M.S., 1961, Catholic University of
America; M.A. State University of New York at Buffalo; Ph.D., 1973 Graduate Theological
Union, Berkeley, California; J.D. University of San Francisco.
I State v. Webb, 216 Mo. 378, 115 S.W. 998 (1909); Commonwealth v. Bown, 13 Mass. 356
(1816). See also Annot., 13 A.L.R. 1259 (1921); W. LA FAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 569
(1972).
2 N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW 264 (1961).
3 State v. Ehlers, 98 N.J.L. 236, 241, 119 A. 15, 17 (1922) (defendant found guilty of murder
for shooting son although state had no evidence of motive).
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who commits euthanasia bears no ill will toward his victim and believes
his act is morally justified, but he nonetheless acts with malice if he is
able to comprehend that society prohibits his act regardless of his per-
sonal belief."4
Malice, therefore, is a significant concept, accepted as a datum in the
American system of law. One of the first" cases involving euthanasia
clearly showed this. In People v. Kirby," the defense counsel argued that
the defendant, who had drowned his daughter and stepson "because he
thought it better for them to go into eternity than to stop in this world,"
could not be convicted of murder because "there was no evidence of mal-
ice against the children, but, on the contrary, it appeared he was much
attached to them." The 'court, rejecting this interpretation of malice,
stated that "[elvery willful and intentional taking [of] the life of a human
being, without a justifiable cause, is murder, if done with deliberation and
not in the heat of passion, and legal malice is always implied in such
cases."
This common law absolutist view did not recognize motive as a de-
fense to a charge of murder:
If the proved facts established that the defendant in fact did the killing
willfully, that is, with intent to kill ... and as the result of premeditation
and deliberation, thereby implying preconsideration and determination,
there is murder in the first degree, no matter what [the] defendant's motive
may have been .... 7
Furthermore, even the consent of the victim was no defense to the charge
of murder under the common law.8 Thus, since the factors which distin-
guished euthanasia from other deliberate acts of killing-a humanitarian
motive and consent of the victim-were not recognized at common law,
euthanasia was not deemed an exception to a murder charge.
Case Law
One of the first reported cases which involved euthanasia was People
v. Roberts,9 wherein the defendant had helped his incurably ill wife to
commit suicide by mixing her a poison potion. The defense argued that
since suicide was not an offense, the husband could not be charged as an
accessory. While the court found that the husband was not an accessory,
People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 322, 411 P.2d 911, 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822 (1966).
o 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 28 (N.Y. 1823).
o Id.
7 98 N.J.L. at 240, 119 A. at 17.
8 Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, 671, 108 S.W. 1139,. 1141 (1907) (guilty of first degree
murder for shooting woman who stated that she wanted to die with the defendant).
9 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920).
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he was found guilty of the statutory offense of administering poision.1o
The leading federal case, Repouille v. United States,' involved an
immigrant who had been denied citizenship on the ground that he was
not of "good moral character." Mr. Repouille had deliberately put his
thirteen year old son to death with chloroform. The son was blind, mute,
severely deformed and had suffered a serious brain injury at birth. The
child, therefore, was unable to feed himself, voided involuntarily and
spent his entire life in a crib."2 After the killing, Repouille was indicted
for first degree manslaughter." At trial, the jury found him guilty of man-
slaughter in the second degree, but recommended mercy, since the defen-
dant was the sole source of income for his family and was found to be of
"good moral character." 4 The judge, although staying execution, sen-
tenced Repouille to between five and ten years in prison. In determining
whether Repouille's conduct conformed to generally-accepted moral con-
ventions, the Court of Appeals noted its difficulty in reviewing the case:
[W]e all know that there are great numbers of people of the most unim-
peachable virtue, who think it morally justifiable to put an end to life so
inexorably destined to be a burden to others, and-so far as any possible
interest of its own is concerned-condemned to a brutish existence, lower
indeed than all but the lowest forms of sentient life . , . . [T]he jury which
tried Repouille did not feel any moral. repulsion at his crime. Although it
was inescapably murder in the first degree, not only did they [the jury]
bring in a verdict that was flatly in the face of the facts and utterly ab-
surd-for manslaughter in the second degree presupposes that the killing
has not been deliberate-but they coupled even that with a recommenda-
tion which showed that in substance they wished to exculpate the offender.
Moreover, it is also plain, from the sentence which he imposed, that the
judge could not have seriously disagreed with their recommendation."
Although motive is not a defense to a murder charge in any American
jurisdiction, the perpetrator of a mercy killing usually is not punished."
Modern cases suggest a sympathetic judicial attitude if the accused was
motivated by mercy for his victim, despite the legal irrelevancy of motive.
One such case involved Otto Werner, a sixty-nine year old resident of
Chicago. 71 Werner was charged with murder for suffocating his crippled
and bedridden wife upon learning that they were being sent to a nursing
10 Id. at 198, 178 N.W. at 693.
" 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 153.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See Comment, The Right To Die, 10 CAL. W.L. REv. 613, 614-15 (1974).
17 People v. Werner, Crim. No. 58-3636 (Cook County Crim: Ct. Ill. 1958); Williams, Eutha-
nasia and Abortion, 38 U. COLo. L. REv. 178, 184-87 (1966).
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home. At trial, he pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and the plea
was accepted. Upon receiving testimony of the defendant's loving and de-
voted care for his wife, the judge suggested that the defendant withdraw
his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty. The court then acquitted
him."8 This case vividly demonstrates that although motive has never
been recognized as a defense at common law, it has proven relevant
through the actions of judges and juries, and has thus become a de facto
mitigating circumstance.19 Since motive is a relevant factor in euthanasia
cases, difficulties arise when the pretention is made that it is not a consid-
eration. To solve this dilemma, it has been suggested that American law
expand the role of motive in the definition of homicide." In Europe, a
dramatic shift has occurred in the criminal law, in that the focus rests
upon the actor, rather than the crime committed.21 For example, in both
Switzerland and Germany, statutory law specifically recognized the moti-
vation of the defendant in arriving at the grading of the offense and the
ensuing sentence.2 2 Similarly, the German Penal Code requires that, un-
less "base motives" compel the commission of the homicide, a murder
charge cannot be sustained.238 The Swiss Penal Code expressly places an
obligation upon the judge to mitigate punishment when "honorable mo-
tives" induced the homicidal act. "
These countries have deemphasized the traditional concepts of pre-
meditation and deliberation, and have scrutinized the motive of the mur-
der as a substantive element in the classification of homicide. Mitigated
charges and punishment are justified on the belief that the reprehensive-
ness of the act is reduced when the actor is motivated by compassion and
when the decedent has consented to his death. The problem of motive in
the area of euthanasia is also highlighted when the role of rehabilitation,
the acknowledged primary object of punishment in the United States, is
evaluated. If a person has been motivated by mercy and compassion to
relieve a patient of a painful existence, at the patient's own request, the
likelihood of any future killing is almost nonexistent.
It is suggested that any progression from the criminality of euthana-
sia to its legalization should employ an examination of motive as an inter-
mediate step, whereby motive could be afforded greater recognition as an
"8 Williams, supra note 17, at 186 n.15.
'9 See Kalven, A Special Corner of Civil Liberties: A Legal View I, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1223,
1235 (1956).
'0 Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539, 549
(1969).
" See generally Silving, Euthanasia: A Study of Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 350, 351 (1954).
" Id. at 363.
13 Id. at 363 n.49.
11 Id. at 363-67.
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element of a homicide case. The creation of such an exception would not
be unique in American criminal law. In New York State, for example, if a
defendant commits a murder "under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance," the offense is reduced to first-degree manslaughter." The
same is true in California, where it is labeled the defense of "diminished
capacity. '2 6 In both jurisdictions, while the objective act is unlawful
homicide, special circumstances peculiar to the actor are recognized. The
confusion created by failures to indict, acquittals, suspended sentences,
and reprieves could be avoided if motive were delineated as an element of
the crime.
II. THE DEFINITION OF EUTHANASIA
One of the most difficult problems attendant to many euthanasia dis-
cussions is the equivocations of authors in formulating a definition. There
is "active" and "passive" euthanasia, "voluntary" and "involuntary" eu-
thanasia, as well as several combinations of these terms. It will, perhaps,
lessen the confusion if we discuss these concepts at the outset of this
study.
The broadest categorization of this term distinguishes active and pas-
sive euthanasia. Active euthanasia connotes any treatment, such as a
drug, which will result in the death of a terminally ill person. Active eu-
thanasia usually refers only to those patients who first request its
administration.2 7
Passive euthanasia is the withdrawal of life-sustaining mechanisms
and treatments, such as a respirator or blood transfusion, so that a termi-
nally ill patient may pass away quickly. Some advocates of passive eutha-
nasia even maintain that life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn
when a dying patient is physically unable to give consent. Such consent,
they argue, can be given by the next of kin or, in certain circumstances,
the attending physicians, as in the Quinlan case. 8
Irrespective of the validity of this nomenclature, euthanasia consti-
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2) (McKinney 1975).
See, e.g., People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969).
Once facts are adduced which would constitute a basis for finding that defendant had
both diminished capacity due to mental defect, mental illness, or intoxication, and
also unconsciousness or lack of the intent to kill, the trial court. . .[must] supple-
ment the statutory definition of involuntary manslaughter. It must also instruct that
if, due to diminished capacity the defendant had neither malice nor intent to kill, the
offense could be no greater than voluntary manslaughter.
Id. at 391, 461 P.2d at 392, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
" See L. COLEBROOK, A PLAN FOR VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA (1962); Williams, Euthanasia
Legislation: A Rejoiner to the Non-Religious Objections, in EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO
DEATH 134, 135 (A. Dowining ed. 1977).
"2 See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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tutes the taking of a human life. One distinction which should be made,
however, is between euthanasia and "allowing one to die." Joseph Fletch-
er, the noted theologian, proposed that the relevant criteria should be
"whether on all the facts we should be inclined to speak of the activity as
one that causes harm or one that merely permits harm to occur." 9 Per-
haps the best formulation of the question is that of Paul Ramsey, who
rejected Dr. Fletcher's justification for inducing death, equating it "with
permitting death to occur." Such confusion cannot be justified on moral
grounds:
[D]oing something and omitting something in order to do something else
are different sorts of acts. To do or not to do something may, then, be sub-
ject to different moral evaluations. One may be wrong and the other may be
right, even if these decisions and actions are followed by the same end re-
sult, namely, the death of a patient.
What Fletcher has gained by an improper characterization of actions
that allow a patient to die while caring for him-by calling them indirect
voluntary euthanasia-is that, without abandoning the case he and many
other moralists have made for only caring for the dying, he can more readily
succeed in apparently reducing the warrants for omitting medical interven-
tions to the moral equivalent of the alleged warrants for acts of direct
euthanasia.
But to respond in this way would exhibit a considerable misunder-
standing of the positive quality and proper purpose intended in only caring
for the dying. . . . These actions are fulfillments of the categorical impera-
tive: Never abandon care! . . . [T]hey effectuate or hasten the coming of no
end at all. Upon ceasing to try to rescue the perishing, one then is free to
care for the dying. 0
Ramsey insists that the criterion must always be care for the dying.
We must first establish the "moral limits surrounding efforts to save life"
so that medical treatment will cease when appropriate, and caring for the
dying will begin.' 1 One focus must center on the life, not the death, of the
patient. Thus, Ramsey has adopted a middle view, adopting neither the
position that there is never a reason to cease using life-sustaining medical
procedures, nor one that advocates the active killing of terminal patients.
Rather, he prefers to leave the determination of when cure has become
impossible, and when the process of dying has commenced, to the physi-
cian and patient together.8" His analysis, it is submitted, respects the sub-
jective and objective meanings of the total situation.
Ramsey's analysis appears to offer the best hope for resolving a con-
" Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1007 (1967).
" P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 151-53 (1970).
" Id. at 144-57.
32 Id. at 134.
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fusing semantic problem. It does not, however, solve the problems of the
reality of euthanasia, which can be viewed as a continuum of situations
requiring implementation of the patient's right to be the decisionmaker.
At one end is the nonterminal patient, confronted with risks and alterna-
tives in selecting treatment. Next, the terminal patient must decide
whether to submit to life-sustaining treatment. Further along is the ter-
minal patient who may request the discontinuance of the life-sustaining
treatment. Finally, there is the terminal patient requesting that his life be
shortened by the rendition of a death producing agent. All but the last
situation is dealt with in Ramsey's analysis.
III. THE RIGHT TO DIE
Is there a constitutional right to die? In a certain sense, there ap-
pears to be at least a limited right. This right arises when a deeply-held
religious or conscientious motive is in issue for a competent adult, and
there is no compelling state interest which insists upon the preservation
of life. Since this involves the free exercise clause of the first amendment,
we are not certain whether, constitutionally, such a right exists for any
citizen who does not invoke the clause. It may be that, as Justice White
expressed in his dissent in Welsh v. United States,38 "the First Amend-
ment itself contains a religious classification," a classification which need
not be expanded to include nonreligious believers under 'the rubric of
neutrality."' If this were the case, the right should be restricted to those
who object on strictly religious grounds. As will be seen, however, this
right has been extended to all competent adults no longer wishing to con-
tinue life-saving treatment. Its justification, therefore, may exist under
the rubric of privacy and self-determination.
Both Sherbert v. Verner" and Yoder v. Wisconsins marked a major
implementation of the free exercise clause. In Sherbert, Justice Brennan
summarized the limits of state intrusion: "It is basic that no showing
merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would
suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation. 3 7 Even if a compelling state interest is shown, the state must
"demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
3 398 U.S. 333 (1970)(ruling that Welsh was entitled to a conscientious objector exemption
although he had no specific religious beliefs justifying this status).
" Id. at 372-73 (White, J., dissenting).
35 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Supreme Court held that the state could not deny unemploy-
ment compensation to a member of the Seventh Day Adventists who refused to accept a job
that required her to work on her Sabbath day. Id. at 410.
30 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
3' 374 U.S. at 406 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944)).
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abuses without infringing First Amendment rights."" In Yoder, for exam-
ple, the Court found* unconstitutional a compulsory education statute as
applied to the Amish, noting the absence of any state interest "of suffi-
cient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the
Free Exercise Clause."8 9 Yoder may be viewed as a substantial expansion
of the area in which free exercise claims can viably be asserted. The test
consists of an ad hoc balancing, since in each case a court must determine
if a particular interest is substantial, if a person's rights are indeed reli-
gious, and if religious, whether they have been seriously abridged. Sher-
bert and Yoder therefore presented these criteria: if the individual dem-
onstrates that his actions are sincerely religious and have been seriously
interfered with as a result of a state regulation, the state must demon-
strate that it was a compelling interest in the regulation which could not
be promoted by a less restrictive means. In the absence of such a compel-
ling interest, the state must allow the free exercise of religious activity."'
"Right to die" cases may be approached in light of the free exercise
clause. The cases themselves are a mixed assortment. Indeed, there are
few reported instances dealing with the termination of medical treatment
at a patient's request in order to permit passive euthanasia.4 ' In In re
President & Directors of Georgetown College," the District of Columbia
Circuit authorized a hospital to administer blood transfusions necessary
to save the life of a Jehovah's Witness who was the mother of a seven
month old child. The court found that the patient was "in extremis and
hardly compos mentis at the time in question; she was as little able com-
petently to decide for herself as any child would be." Therefore, the state
had the "responsibility of guardianship . . . at least to the extent of au-
thorizing treatment to save her life."' 3 Because she was the mother of a
seven month old child, "[tihe state, as parens patriae, . . . would not
allow. . . a parent to abandon a child. . . . "" These reasons resulted in
a finding of a compelling state interest.45 The question here-as in similar
cases-is whether the interest claimed by the state properly is the subject
of legislative or judicial consideration. If the state has the power to pro-
tect citizens against themselves, a myriad of intrusions will be upheld by
the courts, even if free exercise rights are raised. In this case, the court
found three state interests of sufficient gravity to overcome the patient's
" Id. at 407.
39 406 U.S. at 214.
40 Id.
4 See Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
42 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
3 Id. at 1008.
44 Id.
"I Id. at 1009-10.
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free exercise argument: the patient was not compos mentis, the presence
of a minor child, and the protection of the hospital and medical personnel
from potential civil and criminal liability.""
Upon close examination, the reasons enunciated here appear ques-
tionable. The patient had clearly and competently invoked her free exer-
cise claim while lucid. Moreover, there was little likelihood of her child
becoming a ward of the state since her husband, who had acquiesced in
her decision, was capable of continuing his parental responsibility. Fi-
nally, both she and her husband had signed an unambiguous statement
releasing the hospital, its personnel and physicians from all civil liabil-
ity. 7 While criminal liability arguably was possible, the circumstances of
Georgetown clearly minimized the likelihood of such a prosecution.
This case exemplifies the courts' theoretical awareness of the funda-
mental nature of free exercise rights and their recognition that a substan-
tial free exercise claim should only be denied if the state can demonstrate
a compelling purpose for such denial. Nonetheless, the courts have con-
sistently found such compelling purposes, no matter how viable the free
exercise argument. The dissent of Justice Burger in Georgetown clearly
describes this problem:
The affirmative enforcement of a right growing out of possible moral duty of
the hospital toward the patient does not seem to meet the standards of jus-
ticiability especially when the only remedy is judicial compulsion touching
the sensitive area of conscience and religious belief.'8
One exception to this trend was In re Osborne,'9 wherein the court
denied a request for the appointment of a guardian to consent to the ad-
ministration of blood transfusions to a man who was a Jehovah's Witness.
Although the patient was the father of two minor children, the court rea-
soned that in the event of his death, because of the close family relation-
ship which existed, "the children would be well cared for, and .. .the
family business would continue to supply material needs."50 The court
also determined that the patient was lucid and capable of making a ra-
tional choice. 5' As in Georgetown, the patient had executed a statement
refusing to submit to the transfusion and releasing the hospital from lia-
bility. 2 In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals
concluded:
46 Id. at 1008-10.
'7 Id. at 1009.
,8 Id. at 1016 (Burger, J., dissenting).
'9 294 A.2d 372 (App. D.C. 1972).
6" Id. at 374.
1 Id.
6' Id. at 373.
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In reaching her decision, Judge Bacon necessarily resolved the two critical
questions presented-(1) has the patient validly and knowingly chosen this
course for his life, and (2) is there compelling state interest which justifies
overriding that decision? Based on this unique record, we have been unable
to conclude that judicial intervention respecting the wishes and religious
beliefs of the patient was warranted under our law. 5
Similarly, in In re Estate of Brooks," the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the state could not force a Jehovah's Witness, who was mentally
competent, without minor children, and willing to execute a release, to
submit to a blood transfusion.55 The court premised its decision on the
constitutional "right to be let alone," thus grounding its decision on a
form of the right to privacy:
Even though we may consider appellant's beliefs unwise, foolish or ridicu-
lous, in the absence of an overriding danger to society we may not permit
interference therewith in the form of a conservatorship established in the
waning hours of her life for the sole purpose of compelling her to accept
medical treatment forbidden by her religious principles, and previously re-
fused by her with full knowledge of the probable consequences. In the final
analysis, what has happened here involves a judicial attempt to decide what
course of action is best for a particular individual, notwithstanding that in-
dividual's contrary views based upon religious convictions. Such actions
cannot be constitutionally countenanced."
This decision, along with that of Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc. v.
Martinez," presents a direct challenge to the validity of the compelling
state interest in this area. Both decisions, involving elderly persons near
death who refused ordinary treatment, declared that the sanctity of life is
not seriously endangered when dying patients choose a peaceful death.
The decision in Martinez is especially noteworthy, since no free exercise
argument was made." These holdings, it is suggested, indicate the exis-
tence of judicial support for the rationale that the "compelling state in-
terest" test should be used to support a limited right to die, at least when
a free exercise claim is made. At the same time, in light of the right to
privacy, the court's invasion of an individual's freedom to make personal
decisions, is disturbing. The essence of privacy is the individual's ability
to determine his or her destiny with little or no interference from others,
including the state. Absent a clear and serious state interest, therefore,
" Id. at 375.
32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
Id. at 372, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
Id. at 373-74, 205 N.E.2d at 442-43.
67 No. 71-12687 (Cir. Ct. Dade County, Fla., July 2, 1971). See also Byrn, Compulsory Life-
saving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1975).
" See Byrn, supra note 57, at 2-4.
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courts should not interfere. Such an interest, it is submitted, will only be
present when there is a grave threat to the public welfare. 9 This type of
interest does not impact on an individual's decision to submit voluntarily
to passive euthanasia, whether due to religious or purely personal
motives.
IV. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Perhaps the most decisive argument supporting voluntary euthanasia
is the constitutional right to privacy. This right first received constitu-
tional protection in Griswold v. Connecticut,s ° wherein Justice Douglai
expounded the concept of zones of privacy:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance . . . . Various guarantees create zones of pri-
vacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one .... The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in
its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people." 61
If a limited right to die exists within this zone of privacy, when if
ever, may a state seek to restrict such a right? In Griswold the Supreme
Court has suggested an answer:
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental per-
sonal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply
on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the
effectuation of a proper state purpose. "Where there is a significant en-
croachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing
a subordinating interest which is compelling."'6
Whether euthanasia is constitutionally permissible hinges on whether
a right to reject the continuation of life exists within the "penumbra" of
privacy. The essence of the right to privacy lies in the unique destiny of
59 Thus, in the "snake handling cases," the danger to the general public through the han-
dling of poisonous snakes for the purpose of testing one's religious faith, was sufficiently
strong to override even a free exercise claim. Cf. State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d
179, appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 942 (1949); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708
.(1948); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
01 Id. at 484.
*z Id. at 497.
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each human being, which may be dictated neither by law nor state. The
reason is evident-to do so would destroy freedom at its very core, since
freedom, if it means anything at all, is not merely a freedom from re-
straint and coercion, but is also the ability to choose a destiny, and to
have that decision respected by others, including the state. In a sense,
that is why the state exists-to safeguard each individual's freedom of
choice. ,
This right to be left alone had been clearly recognized in the context
of the fourth amendment. "The overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwar-
ranted intrusion by the State."" Personal integrity is a cherished value in
our society and human dignity and privacy are fundamental human inter-
ests. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States,6" summa-
rized the policy underlying the guarantees of privacy:
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments is
much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness .... They sought to pro-
tect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sen-
sations. They conferred ... the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. "
This approach was expanded in recent opinions on abortion, where
the Supreme Court included in the guarantee of personal privacy those
"personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.' "66 This protection was deemed broad enough to
include a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy.67 The reasoning of the
Court is almost entirely negative; it is premised on the right to be left
alone. This rationale, however, does not explain the right to privacy.
Whether this right allows the absolute determination of an individual's
destiny is unclear. Can a patient be forced to undergo a painful operation'
for cancer when the outcome is uncertain? Must an individual remain on
a respirator when he has previously expressed a desire to die? The valid-
ity of a competent decision by an adult who suffers from an incurable
disease or pathology, and whose life is sustained by mechanized, chemi-
63 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Supreme Court decided that ob-
taining a blood sample for a blood-alcohol test did not violate petitioner's due process
rights. Id. at 771.
6- 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The majority held that evidence obtained through wire-tapping was
admissible to prove that the defendant was guilty of violating the National Prohibition Act.
Id. at 466.
11 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
66 410 U.S. at 152.
"' Id. at 154.
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cal, or other such artificial means,68 is in issue. It is imperative that we
determine whether the right to privacy encompasses passive euthanasia.
If it does, the objective standards which may be applied when the patient
is comatose must also be analyzed.
The rationale of Roe v. Wade suggests the existence of such a right.
The Court relied on the notion of "meaningful human life," rather than
"potential" life, "because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb."' 9 The argument for euthana-
sia is evident-a terminal patient who has only excrutiating pain or un-
conscious life to look forward to may no longer have the capacity for a
"meaningful life." He may therefore choose to "be left alone," much like
the woman who may decide whether or not to abort. If the right to pri-
vacy allows a doctor to kill potential human life at the request of the
patient, a fortiori, the same right of privacy should exist when it is deter-
mined that the patient is no longer capable of "meaningful life."
Additionally, as expressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re
Quinlan, the express desire of the patient may not be imperative; this
right may be exercised by others, in the name of privacy: "we have con-
cluded that Karen's right of privacy may be asserted on her behalf by her
guardian under the peculiar circumstances here present. 7 0 In other
words, the right of privacy is so fundamental that others, who had been
intimately involved with the patient, should be able to exercise it in cir-
cumstances when the patient is unable to do so.
Griswold did not define the scope of the right of privacy, but rather
left its boundaries to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The Roe de-
cision does offer support for a limited right to die, in the name of being
left alone. Like Roe, the decision to die is highly private and harms, if
anyone, only the individual making the decision. In a sense, the "right to
die" is more personal than the decision to abort since no potentially inde-
pendent life is destroyed. Indeed, such a dying patient has even less pros-
pect for a "meaningful" life than a fetus, since the fetus would probably
develop into a mature, meaningful human life. The right to privacy
should therefore encompass this right to be left alone, including the re-
fusal of procedures which will only prolong dying.
A Pennsylvania lower court has recognized the relation between pri-
vacy and the right to refuse medical care. In a case involving the refusal
of a chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic to submit to cancer therapy,
the court declared:
" The "Natural Death Act" of California is a carefully drawn act which deals with this
situation. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 to 7195 (West Supp. 1977).
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
70 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
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In our opinion the constitutional right of privacy [citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)] includes the right of a mature competent adult to refuse to
accept medical recommendations that may prolong one's life and which, to a
third person at least, appear to be in his best interests; in short, that the
right of privacy includes a right to die with which the state should not inter-
fere where there are no minor or unborn children and no clear and present
danger to public health, welfare or morals. If the person was competent
while being presented with the decision and in making the decision which
she did, the Court should not interfere even though her decision might be
considered unwise, foolish or ridiculous. 7'
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in permitting an ap-
pointed guardian to decide whether to terminate Karen Quinlan's life-
preserving medical care, based its decision on the right to privacy. The
Quinlan Court expressly stated that the right of privacy, as developed in
Roe, could justify a patient's decision to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment, since "the State's interest contra weakens and the individual's
right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the
prognosis dims. Ultimately, there comes a point at which the individual's
rights overcome the State interest." 2 Quinlan is of special importance
since the decision could not be made by the patient. The analysis of the
right to privacy under these circumstances is different and difficult, since
the individual involved was comatose and had never expressed an opinion
with respect to euthanasia. To overcome this difficulty, the Quinlan
Court radically extended the right of privacy which may be asserted by a
guardian. "The only practical way to prevent the destruction of the right
is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judg-
ment . . . as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances."" s
Thus, the guardian, with the concurrence of the family, physicians and
the hospital's "ethics committee," was permitted to authorize termination
of care even when there was no direct evidence concerning Karen's
wishes. 74 The New Jersey Court thereby surpasses Roe in finding such an
extension to the right to privacy. This is a valid development of case law
and the court's holding appears well-reasoned. When there is no prior
expression to terminate care, termination becomes difficult to justify
under the rubric of privacy. The rationale for allowing a guardian to as-
sert this right for a patient who has not expressed such a desire lacks a
precise legal foundation. Equity, however, might provide a solution if
some objective standard can be articulated.
In the absence of any legislative directive in this area, the courts
71 In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 2d 619, 623 (C.P. Northampton County 1973).
72 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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must rely on their equity powers, while avoiding arbitrary decisions prem-
ised upon subjective standards. If the patient is not capable of expressing
an intent there should be a presumption in favor of life. The fundamental
autonomy of the individual demands this, and triggers a presumption
that life should not be terminated if no prior decision had been made by
the patient. The right to privacy is, if anything, two-edged.
Moreover, it should be recognized that the problems of euthanasia
and abortion involve more than a simple balancing of governmental inter-
ests and individual rights. Basic interests, as well as the patient's own
interests, may conflict. It should be recognized, therefore, that although a
court may not be the ideal forum in which to resolve these essentially
moral questions, no preferable alternative is apparent.
In a recent significant case, Eichner v. Dillon75 the appellate division
of the New York Supreme Court restricted the termination of extraordi-
nary life supporting treatments to the case where the patient is "termi-
nally ill," in a vegetative coma characterized as "permanent," "chronic"
or "irreversible" with an extremely remote possibility of recovery.78 Em-
phasizing this "rigid standard," the court stressed that "[t]he State's in-
terest in protecting the sanctity of life will tolerate no less stringent medi-
cal standard than this."'7 7 The court also explained its rationale for
approving the removal of supporting apparatus from the chronically vege-
tative patient:
As a matter of established fact, such a patient has no health and, in the true
sense, no life, for the State to protect. . . . Indeed, with Roe in mind, it is
appropriate to note that the State's interest in preservation of the life of the
fetus would appear greater than any possible interest the State may have in
maintaining the continued life of a terminally ill comatose patient . . .
[whose] claim to personhood is certainly no greater than that of the fetus.78
Merely through the force of its own decree, therefore, this court has
declared that a chronically "vegetative" patient is, in fact, dead. It has
further ruled that such a person is no more a human being than a fetus.
The potential abuses implicit in such language-in an opinion designed to
"affirm the dignity and worth of human life"-are staggering.
Justice Mollen recognized that the task of implementing the uncon-
scious patient's right to refuse treatment is facilitated if he has written a
"living will" or has clearly expressed his desires before the onset of in-
competency. Mollen conceded, however, that "[t]his will occur only in a
7' 73 App. Div. 2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (2d Dep't 1980), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d
64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
7' 73 App. Div. 2d at 468, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 465-66, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
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minority of cases," 9 and rejected any requirement of the patient's ex-
plicit testimony. The court thereby adopted the Saikewicz "substituted,"
or proxy judgment, rule.80
The recurring question in these cases is: who shall make the decision
to terminate treatment? The Eichner court spurned the Quinlan stan-
dard, which had suggested that these are decisions to be made not by
courts, but by families and physicians with the approval of an ethics com-
mittee."1 Rather, it adopted Saikewicz's ruling that these decisions "must
reside with the judicial process and the judicial process alone." 2 The
court argued that a judicial presence is necessary to properly balance
such factors as the patient's wishes, the views of the family and the con-
cern for society,8 3 and concluded that "the societal interests to be safe-
guarded are so great that the courts have no choice but to intervene and
examine each case on an individual patient to patient basis."' 4
The court then enunciated the procedure to be followed when ascer-
taining whether life-sustaining measures should be withdrawn from a ter-
minally-ill patient who is unable to consent to such withdrawal: (1) a phy-
sician must certify that the patient is terminally ill and in an irreversible,
permanent vegetative coma, and that prospects for recovery of cognitive
brain functions are extremely remote; (2) the case is then presented to a
hospital committee of at least three physicians, for confirmation of diag-
nosis; (3) if the medical judgment is thereby confirmed, judicial proceed-
ings must be instituted for permission to withdraw life-sustaining mea-
sures; (4) the attorney general and district attorney must be notified, and
they may select additional physicians to examine the patient; and (5) a
guardian ad litem must be appointed to protect the patient's interests.8 "
Under this procedure, a minimum of four to six physicians, five at-
torneys and one judge is required for permission to withdraw extraordi-
nary life-supporting systems from a terminally ill, chronically vegetative
patient. This view, however, has been rejected by two of the nation's most
distinguished medical ethicists. Robert Veatch and Richard McCormick,
Id. at 470-71, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
80 Id. at 473, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 548. The New York Court of Appeals limited its affirmance to
the fact that the patient, Brother Fox, had expressly stated prior to his illness that he would
decline life sustaining treatment if he were even placed in a situation similar to that of
Karen Quinlan. 52 N.Y.2d at 378, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. The Court, how-
ever, did not indicate whether the "substituted" or proxy judgment rule of the appellate
division would have been applied if Brother Fox had made no express statements with re-
spect to the termination of life sustaining treatment.
" 73 App. Div. 2d at 475, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
" Id. at 475, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
83 Id.
8" Id. at 476, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
" Id. at 476-77, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
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of Georgetown's Kennedy Institute for Bioethics, have commented that
"[w]e are convinced that the appropriate decision is so clear that it need
not have gone to court, and ought not to do so in similar cases." 86
It is submitted that the analysis in Eichner was correct, at least as
applied to comatose patients, since the decision to terminate the treat-
ment of a comatose individual can only be exercised vicariously. The
medical prognosis evaluation test was derived from Quinlan, but the sub-
stitute judgment which must be judicially approved was drawn from
Saikewicz. While the Eichner court expressly stated that judicial involve-
ment did not betoken a distrust either of the medical prognosis or of
those who made the substitute judgment, it felt that each case would,
nonetheless, require court approval in this delicate area of public policy.
The Eichner procedure, however, makes such cases intolerably lengthy
and expensive, and needlessly prolongs the suffering of the next of kin.
Moreover, nothing is truly accomplished through the introduction of this
final judicial procedure, since a court is no more able to judge the medical
prognosis than the original medical personnel themselves. The Quinlan
procedure, therefore, is more logical, humane, and reassuring than either
that of Saikewicz or Eichner.
When the patient's desires are unknown, and left to the speculation
of family and friends, it seems appropriate that the court review the
choices to be made. Judicial review is unnecessary, however, when medi-
cal criteria establish that the patient is terminally ill and in an irreversi-
ble, permanent, or chronic vegetative coma from which the possibility of
recovery is extremely remote. While it is within the court's proper sphere
to enunciate general guidelines, it is neither desirable nor logical for the
court routinely to review medical prognoses unless there is a real choice
between painful treatment, with some chance of remission, and no treat-
ment, with a "peaceful" death.
Since the right to die is based on the right to privacy, it can only
properly be asserted by the patient himself, and not vicariously. It ap-
pears that the substituted judgment criterion, therefore, may not be logi-
cally based upon the right to privacy. When this doctrine is employed to
exercise a right of privacy for the comatose individual, substituted judg-
ment is at best an educated guess, rather than a vicariously exercised
right of privacy for the patient. It is unnecessary to reach the question of
compelling state interest with respect to this problem, since a "right" to
involuntary 'euthanasia, whether active or passive, does not constitution-
ally exist. Case law, including the penumbra doctrine of Griswold, sup-
ports nothing more than voluntary passive euthanasia.
86 Veatch & McCormick, The Preservation of Life and Self Determination, 4 THEOLOGICAL
STUDIES 390 (1980).
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The difficulties inherent in involuntary euthanasia are highlighted by
a discussion of the treatment of handicapped newborns. A common prac-
tice has arisen whereby parents request physicians not to treat such in-
fants, and "allow" them to die. This is not a Roe situation, since the child
has been born and, presumably, enjoys all constitutional rights. Leaving
the fate of such a person to the whims of parents and their doctors is,
therefore, a denial of due process"7 and equal protection."8 A judicial re-
sponse to this aspect of involuntary euthanasia would entail the resolu-
tion of several public policy issues, such as when is the withholding of
treatment morally justified or socially desirable, and who is to make the
termination decision? Legal rules must focus on criteria, procedures, and
decision-making processes for implementing a social policy in this area.
Courts are ill-equipped to evaluate and determine these core issues of
public policy. Rather, these questions must be confronted by the legisla-
ture. The continued failure to do so will result in additional judicial con-
fusion as well as the continued absence of objective standards to be fol-
lowed by parents, hospitals, and medical personnel.
In fashioning the criteria applicable to involuntary euthanasia in this
context, the legislature should recognize that any substituted consent
would really constitute a misnomer. There is no possibility of determining
what choice these infants would make were they able to understand their
present condition. We are dealing in this instance with persons who, even
if provided with life-prolonging treatment, will lead diminished lives. It is
crucial, therefore, to understand that any election not to treat, outside of
the "poor medical prognosis" context, is actually based on a "quality of
life" determination which is essentially a question of social, and hence
legislative, policy. Any legislative guidelines must be clearly defined, and
the circumstances made clear. It may well be that our society is not pre-
pared to articulate such guidelines, and is therefore willing to defer these
cases either to the private discretion of parents and doctors or to- the
87 Cf. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) (judge denied due process to attorney by issuing
contempt citation amidst strong personal feelings); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57 (1972) (mayor, with interest in receiving funds for city, cannot be judge of traffic of-
fenses); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (hearing before judge with interest in conviction
violates due process).
An egregious example of this biased choice is the 1971 John's Hopkins case in which
doctors did not operate on a Down's Syndrome baby with duodenal atresia who died fifteen
days later of starvation. The parents rejected surgery because they did not want to be bur-
dened with a child who would be retarded and incapable of full human development. The
death was completely unnecessary since mongoloids can interact, be trained and lead a rea-
sonably comfortable life. Moreover, the child was otherwise healthy and would not have
required constant medical care. The case clearly shows the necessity of full due process by
the courts which have been lax in enforcing the rights of these human beings and their most
fundamental right, that of life. Cf. Gustason, Mongoloidism, Parental Desires, and the
Right to Life, 16 PERSPECTIVES IN Bio. & MED. 529, 529-33 (1973).
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courts. The consequence of such legislative delegation, however, has been
judicial confusion and the attendant development of misguided termina-
tion standards, both of which combine to deny due process to defective
newborns.
It is evident, therefore, that the legislature should promulgate termi-
nation guidelines, since it possesses the plenary power and investigatory
mechanism to enact laws and regulations for the protection of the public
health and welfare. Moreover, as an elected representative of the people,
the legislature embodies the public will and policy by consent of the gov-
erned. Legislatures inherently enjoy a broader view of society than do
courts, which adjudicate on an individual case-by-case basis.
V. THE QUALITY OF LIFE
A principal argument in favor of all forms of euthanasia refers to the
"quality of life" of handicapped newborns, the severely retarded, and the
terminally ill. The argument itself presupposes a comparative worth
among human beings, raising grave moral and methodological issues
which render the argument vulnerable. As in Quinlan, the argument is
often made that a reasonable person would conclude that an individual
suffering from intense physical and mental pain might himself conclude
that such a life is not worth living, and that the patient, were he alive and
capable of response, might agree. It is therefore reasonable to supply con-
sent, as the Quinlan court did, by dividing responsibility between guard-
ian, family, doctors and an "ethics committee." The major determination
as to when a person "has died," or no longer has a "meaningful life," is
primarily made by the doctors. Although using vague terms such as the
meaning and quality of life, the Quinlan court posited an objective stan-
dard as to when it is legally permissible to withdraw life-support systems
from a comatose individual: the medical prognosis of the patient's inabil-
ity to return to a cognitive and sapient existence must be reasonably cer-
tain, the permission of family, next of kin or guardian must be obtained,
and the hospital ethics committee must acquiesce in the decision. The
Quinlan court thereby enunciated an objective standard, which required
no further judicial intervention.
The Quinlan situation is qualitatively different from the question of
treatment of severely retarded infants, for whom treatment would mean
survival, albeit survival in a diminished human capacity. It is here that
the "quality of life" argument is strongest and most dangerous. In the
case of handicapped newborns, lack of opportunities may exist precisely
because of the social attitudes and failings of healthy people. While these
disabled people will never attain the achievements of "normal" people,
who is to say that such a life is not worth living? The response inevitably
is a value judgment, and should not be made by the judiciary since the
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desire of the person most affected cannot be ascertained. Life and life
alone, whatever its limitations, might be of sufficient worth to him. In
Gleitman v. Cosgrove," a case dealing with a "wrongful life" situation,
the New Jersey court stated:
It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on to it however
heavily burdened. If Jeffrey could have been asked as to whether his life
should be snuffed out before his full term of gestation could run its course,
our felt intuition of human nature tells us he would almost surely choose
life with defects as against no life at all.' 0
The quality of life argument in support of involuntary euthanasia is espe-
cially vulnerable given the problems in obtaining another's consent and
the bias of personal or culturally relative interests. The suffering of
others, no matter how tragic or personal, cannot be considered more im-
portant than the life of the unconscious, the terminally ill, or the defec-
tive newborn. Any mandate requiring an individual to sacrifice his life for
the benefit of society is tantamount to an acceptance of the principle that
rational utility can justify any outcome.
The major weaknesses of the quality of life argument, as well as the
"meaningful" life rationale in the context of the abortion cases and eu-
thanasia, concern the issues of who should determine when life becomes
"meaningful" and to what degree the "quality" of life must be impaired
before it may be terminated."1 These issues seem beyond the scope of any
court to determine, since a value judgment is involved, and our pluralistic
society recognized that there is no consensus as to the ultimate signifi-
cance and meaning of human life. Indeed, for a court to answer such
questions might represent an unconstitutional abridgement of first
amendment rights. The only governmental involvement which can be ac-
ceptable is a juridical or legislative imprimatur upon a medical determi-
nation of when a particular person has passed beyond the realm of recov-
ery, so that any further medical procedures would be futile. This is not,
however, a juridical determination of the "quality of life" or what consti-
tutes a "meaningful life."
A recent article reported that some fourteen percent of the infant
deaths at the Yale University School of Medicine Special Care Nursery
were related to the withholding of treatment. The parents and physicians
had jointly decided that the infant's prognosis for a meaningful life was
very poor. There have been few reported cases in this area. In one in-
" 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
See In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 949 (1980). See also Riga, Phillip Becker: Another Milestone, AMERICA, July 12,
1980, at 8-9.
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stance, Maine Medical Center v. Houle,92 a male infant was born without
a left eye and ear, with a deformed left hand and a tracheoesophageal
fistula.9" Without surgical repair, a minor operation, the infant would die.
The parents were informed of this and directed the physician not to oper-
ate on the child and to withhold feedings and intravenous fluids. The
Center petitioned the State Superior Court for a temporary restraining
order, so that intravenous feedings could be maintained, pending the
court's ruling on the question of surgical intervention. The child devel-
oped seizures which were interpreted as brain damage. The court granted
the restraining order and ordered the parents not to interfere with the
efforts of the physicians to perform surgery, reasoning that to do so would
constitute child neglect, and that "the issue is not the prospective quality
of life to be preserved." 94 Houle held that a physician's evaluation of the
quality of life is beyond the scope of a physician's expertise. Acting as
parens patriae, it appointed a guardian to consent to surgery and enjoin
the parents from interfering with any future medical treatment."
Houle is significant because it reduced the termination issue to one
of life or death and ignored the severe mental retardation and physical
deformity of the infant. The court utilized the standards which it would
have applied to any other child who was not so deformed, and declared
that a child is entitled to the right of life from the moment of birth. It is
interesting to note that this same reasoning was used by Judge Muir in
the lower court Quinlan decision.9 The court there held, inter alia, that
Mr. Quinlan had no authority to assert constitutional rights of privacy on
behalf of his daughter, observing that "the sustenance of life, is not some-
thing degrading, arbitrarily inflicted, unacceptable to contemporary soci-
ety or unnecessary." g In effect, the quality of life argument was rejected
by the lower court, a position with which the New Jersey Supreme Court
agreed.98 Although the final Quinlan ruling predicated the authority to
terminate treatment on the right to privacy, the standard enunciated for
termination-medical prognosis, consent of guardian and ethics commit-
tee-does not relate to the patient's right to privacy. Rather, it involves
an objective condition. This argument, therefore, appears flawed, and
92 Civil No. 74-145 (Cumberland Super. Ct., Me. Feb. 14, 1974), reprinted in part in R.
WEIR, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 185 (1977).
93 Id. This is an abnormal connection between the esophagus and the trachea which results
in the child's aspirating any formula he ingests to the point where he can actually drown
from it.
" Id. at 54.
95 Id.
'4 In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (1975), modified and remanded, 70 N.J.
10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
97 Id. at 269, 348 A.2d at 824.
11 70 N.J. at 15, 355 A.2d at 666.
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should not constitute a basis for euthanasia.
THE DEBATE OVER EUTHANASIA
The principal argument in support of voluntary euthanasia, in both
its passive and active forms, emphasizes the cruelty and inhumanity of
allowing continued suffering in a humanly hopeless situation, especially
when the patient wishes to die. Professor Williams, espousing a quality of
life view, has argued:
The absolute interdiction of suicide and euthanasia involves the impossible
assertion that every life, no matter what its quality or circumstances, is
worth living and obligatory to be lived. This assertion of the value of mere
existence, in the absence of all the activities that give meaning to life, and
in face of disintegration of personality that so often follows from prolonged
agony, will not stand scrutiny. On any rationally acceptable philosophy,
there is no ethical value in living any sort of life; the only life that is worth
living is the good life.9
The argument continues that it is cruel to require a person to experience
a painful death when there is the option of an easy death. The question
should be one of ifhdividual liberty. It is a cruel law which prevents one
suffering from an incurable and painful disease from escaping misery by a
quick death. The finality of death, however, tempers this position. Society
must uphold law for the common good of all. Moreover, it is difficult to
determine when a patient, already deprived of full capacity, truly wishes
to die. What is ardently desired today may be rejected tomorrow.
The Christian notion of the sanctity of life is a strong argument
against euthanasia. Our criminal law itself reflects this traditional value,
since it fails to recognize either merciful motive or consent defenses to
homicide. Justice Brennan, writing in Furman v. Georgia,'00 affirmed this
traditional view:
Death is a unique punishment in the United States. In a society that so
strongly affirms the sanctity of life, not surprisingly the common view is
that death is the ultimate sanction. This natural human feeling appears all
about us. There has been no national debate about punishment, in general
or by imprisonment, comparable to the debate about the punishment of
death. No other punishment has been so continuously restricted . . . nor
has any State yet abolished prisons, as some have abolished this
punishment.' 0'
Supreme Court support for this value appears questionable, however, in
"9 G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, 317 (1958).
,-- 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
'0' Id. at 286.
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light of its affirmance of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia.102
Another aspect of this problem involves the contractual duty be-
tween a doctor and patient 0 3 Such a duty is not absolute, and may be
terminated either by the patient or by withdrawal of the physician, with
proper notice.10 4 In cases of voluntary passive euthanasia, consent by a
competent patient to his physician's termination of medical treatment
appears to be tantamount to dismissal of the doctor, and as such termi-
nates any further legal obligation on the part of the physician. The doc-
tor, therefore, should not be subjected to criminal liability for failure to
administer additional medical treatment.
One view adopts the position that life-sustaining technology in a
modern hospital or nursing home prolongs life, which itself is accompa-
nied by indignity, loss of control, and incessant pain. In such situations,
permitting death with dignity is perceived as the most humane approach.
This reasoning is overly broad, however, since no two patients suffer the
same agonies. Thus, termination decisions must be founded upon case-
by-case analyses.
The relevance of our society's often casual treatment of human life
must be evaluated in light of whether we will accept euthanasia, particu-
larly involuntary and voluntary active euthanasia. A callous disregard for
the sanctity of life will only foster an erosion of respect for life. Voluntary
passive euthanasia should be distinguished, since no direct action is taken
in the furtherance of death, the obligation to treat ends due to the ab-
sence of meaning, and the care of the dying continues until the end. Even
in its secular variety, a recognition of the sanctity of life is necessary for a
humane and compassionate society. The reason is evident-most of us
will someday be in one or the other above-described situations. Fairness
and justice demand objective standards applicable to all. Such standards
become hopelessly confused when the "quality of life" argument is added
to an already difficult amalgam. As applied by the judiciary, that concept
is too subjective, elastic, and arbitrary. The state's duty to protect life is
also apparent as a species of state interest. By choosing euthanasia, the
individual has expressly renounced the right to life. The state can assert
an interest in protecting that right, and override the individual's decision
to die, only when there is a compelling state interest to do so. As the
state's interest grows, therefore, the individual's right to die diminishes.10
Conversely, as recognized by the Quinlan court, when the condition of
the individual becomes serious, the interest of the state diminishes. Addi-
.02 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
103 Cf. Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937) (Physician who has undertaken
treatment of patient may not abandon treatment).
1. Id. at 314, 64 P.2d at 211-12.
105 See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
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tionally, it should be noted that the state's interest in human life is
strong when the question is one of involuntary or voluntary active eutha-
nasia, but almost nonexistent when voluntary passive euthanasia is
involved.
This aspect of state interest is highlighted by an equal protection
argument. Failure to prosecute the perpetrators of involuntary active eu-
thanasia as murderers may constitute a denial of the victims' rights of
due process and equal protection of the law. At the same time, by con-
victing them of murder, the state may be exacting cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. These problems do not arise if euthanasia remains voluntary. In
such cases as Quinlan, however, there is a patent denial of equal protec-
tion, since consent is either absent or deemed implicit. By failing to deal
with those practicing euthanasia as murderers, the terminally ill are left
without adequate legal safeguards of their right to life, although state
homicide laws continue to protect others. Such a classification is inher-
ently suspect, since it catagorizes individuals on the basis of their physi-
cal condition. This approach has received little support, in light of the
substantial segment of our population who seem to think that such homi-
cide is not tantamount to murder.'" This sentiment, however, cannot
constitute a justification for depriving individuals of constitutionally pro-
tected rights.
The scope of these due process and equal protection arguments may
be too broad, since they fall to distinguish the various catagories of pa-
tients. The equal protection clause does not require that similarly situ-
ated persons be treated identically, since they are not an inherently sus-
pect class. Case law has already distinguished various types of dying
persons. The existing cases have tended to protect handicapped newborns
in need of treatment, although the retarded have not fared as well be-
cause their problems have been considered in light of a quality of life
argument. Voluntary active euthanasia remains forbidden to the extent
that aiders and abetters of suicide, even with the consent of their victims,
are still regarded as in violation of the criminal law. Finally, it is safe to
say that after Quinlan and Eichner, the concept and reality of both vol-
untary and involuntary passive euthanasia have been accepted in case
law. Quinlan enunciated the procedure to be followed to ensure no civil
or criminal liability: a hopeless medical prognosis, and agreement by phy-
sicianJamily or guardian, and hospital ethics committee.
There remain areas in which due process and equal protection argu-
A changing public attitude concerning euthanasia is demonstrated by a 1970 Gallup Poll
which showed that fifty-three percent of Americans sampled favored a law which would
allow a doctor painlessly to end the life of an incurably diseased patient if the family so
requested. The poll also showed that the higher a person's education the more likely he was
to support "positive" euthanasia. Chicago Daily News, Jan. 19, 1974, at 5, col. 3.
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ments will continue to be viable, although this will depend on how the
courts accept or handle the vague standard of the "quality of life" argu-
ment, particularly as it is applied to the senile and the severely retarded.
These issues, however, can only be regarded as in a state of flux.
Many questions of public policy remain to be articulated, since our soci-
ety must some day grapple with the unpleasant questions of which cate-
gories of these persons it does not want to treat, and for what reasons.
These policy issues have been avoided thus far in deference to fanciful
judicial discussion concerning "substituted judgment."
VII. HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS
Perhaps the most perplexing involuntary euthanasia cases are those
in which severely disabled infants are allowed to die in accordance with
the common agreement of the parents and physician.1 0 7 Since a newborn
cannot consent to necessary treatment, the primary question is who
should decide whether treatment should be provided.
For an adult, informed and uncoerced consent is a necessary part of
any form of medical treatment.10 8 We deal here with those who are en-
demically incapable of such consent. What, then, should be the termina-
tion criteria? Courts have approached this problem in a variety of ways.
One line of inquiry, adopted by the Quinlan court, seeks to ascertain
what the handicapped newborn would prefer. This is a flawed question,
however, since it injects our own values onto the child, who has no basis
-for the fears and horrors we might have for ourselves in a similar state.
We project our values onto the child by this quality of life argument,
which presupposes not only a higher level of health, consciousness, and
awareness, but also a degeneration from that state. 09 By definition, this
condition is absent from the defective newborn, who might well be happy
and satisfied to live out his limited human potential, having never real-
ized what is absent. We must not confuse our suffering with that of the
child who has never known any other existence and who may be perfectly
content to live with his deformities." 0 Indeed, a surprising number of
these children are capable of giving and receiving love and taking care of
themselves."' In protected or sheltered environments, many of them can
lead productive lives.
Correlations exist between the degree of parental acceptance of
107 For a comprehensive survey of this question, see Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of
Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1975).
See generally Riga, Informed Consent, 10 LINCOLN L. REV. 159 (1977).
Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1976).
110 Cooke, Whose Suffering?, 80 J. OF PEDIATRICS 906 (1972).
"I E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 57-129 (1963).
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handicapped children and, religion, social class, and the presence of sup-
portive friends and relatives.'1 2 There is no certain mandate that a dimin-
ished future must trouble a person who has known no other type of life.
Why, then, should such a person be killed "for their own good" or, simi-
larly, not treated as other "normal" children and thus "allowed to die?"
As a society, we must be skeptical of a strong group willing to condone
the killing of a weaker group "for their own good."
The easier cases to decide in this area involve those persons whose
medical prognosis is without hope, and who would die in a very short
time regardless of any efforts. As will be seen, once such a diagnosis has
been made in good faith, support systems may legally and morally be dis-
continued, since such procedures no longer have meaning or signifi-
cance.11 8 One is obligated neither to do the futile nor continue the useless.
This was the basic conclusion of the Quinlan court as it announced the
procedure to be followed in such cases, without further judicial
intervention.
More difficult cases are presented by the mentally or physically
handicapped persons who certainly will live diminished lives, but from
whom accepted and comparatively simple procedures are withheld so that
they are "allowed to die." ' Although there are many arguments for such
non-treatment,"5 the present discussion will be limited to the contention
that such children should be allowed to die "in their own best interests."
This situation is the most difficult, of course, since there can be no input
from the child." 6 The only available method is that of substituted judg-
ment, with all its pitfalls of value substitution.1 7 The problem confronted
is both moral and legal. The moral question addresses which category of
patients our society does not wish to treat. The legal question involves
the equal protection difficulties arising from the special treatment of
these people.
It should be clear that neither parents nor physicians can be author-
ized to make such decisions for another human being. Each has a signifi-
cant conflict of interest which impairs his judgment. The parents may be
influenced by their desire to save their own psychological and economic
lives, as well as those of their other children. In this sense, the handi-
capped children become a "burden." The question which must be asked,
" Zuk, The Religious Factor and the Role of Guilt in Parental Acceptance of the Re-
tarded Child, 64 Am. J. oF MENTAL DEFICIENCY 139 (1959).
113 See notes 125-128 infra.
"' See Duff & Cambell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery, 289
NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973).
'6 See Robertson, supra note 107 at 61.
See Schrag, Rights Over Children, 7 J. OF VALUE INQUIRY 96 (1973).
See Riga, supra note 108 at 169-80.
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however, is to whom? Similarly, the physician is most affected by those
whose feelings are most visible and tangible-the parents. In fact, most
physicians 8 tend not to want to treat such infants, since they may be
viewed as representing a failure for the physicians, who may consider
such infants better off dead, even though some parents do not in fact
share these views.'1 9 If these studies are correct, a significant problem ex-
ists, since it demonstrates that many treating physicians believe in the
"quality of life" theory.
Who, then, can be trusted with such decisions? The Quinlan case
posited a protective scheme for incompetents who are in a hopeless situa-
tion. The same reasoning may be applied to newborn handicapped chil-
dren. While acknowledging the parents as appropriate guardians and rec-
ognizing their right to participate in the decision to terminate treatment,
the court stated that such a decision would be legally valid only if it had
the approval of a hospital ethics committee. 20 Whatever one thinks of
the ideal function of such a committee, it does acknowledge the imper-
missibility of a physician and family making such important decisions
alone. This method of decision diffusion should not be construed as an
unwillingness to assume personal responsibility on the part of parents
and physicians, 2 ' but rather as an incipient effort to reach a societal con-
sensus. This approach is in accordance with Professor Robertson's sugges-
tion that society, through the legislature or courts, should recognize cer-
tain objective criteria which can justify the refusal of treatment:
As authoritative and specific criteria have eased the physicians' determina-
tion of when brain death has occurred, the risks of delegating treatment to
parents, physicians, or committees can be similarly lessened if specific crite-
ria are developed to describe defective characteristics in the familial or in-
stitutional situations in which treatment may be withheld from defective
infants.'22
It also seems that parents should be informed of the possibility of taking
handicapped infants home. Recent studies have shown that a wholesome
familial experience is much more prevalent than previously suspected:
"[t]hose who have lived with the handicapped seem to reject any neces-
sary incompatibility between being handicapped and leading a worth-
while life, a conclusion that ought to be taken into account by those
charged with making decisions about 'the right to life' of infants with
1" See Darling, Parents, Physicians and Spina Bifida, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 11-12
(August 1977).
"9 Id. at 12.
1 0 70 N.J. at 54, 335 A.2d at 671.
... Annas, In re Quinlan: Legal Comfort for Doctors, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 29, 31
(June 1976).
"I See Robertson, supra note 107, at 266.
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birth defects. 1 23
Studies of Protestant and Catholic mothers of retarded children
showed the latter to be far more accepting of their children than the for-
mer. Zuk concluded that Catholics were more accepting "due to the ex-
plicit absolution from personal guilt offered by their religious belief," and
that a mother could accept the child in a framework of "a test of her
religious faith . . . a special gift of God." '' Moreover, women are much
more accepting of handicapped children than men, regardless of the cul-
tural or intellectual level. 2 ' Cultural levels, however, are also relevant.
"[T]he appearance of a defective newborn is more self-devastating than
in an earlier time when a family needed more children and when children
were not so regarded as expressions of the selves of parents.' ' 26
Middle-class culture stresses the perfect and normal, and loathes the
imperfect and defective. With the developing technology, such as the
technique of amniocentesis, handicapped newborns are frequently looked
upon as "mistakes" which could have been prevented through selective
abortion, a procedure which is accepted by the vast majority of the Amer-
ican people. 27 It is reasonable to conclude that attitudes toward handi-
capped newborns will become progressively more negative as the
processes of prenatal diagnosis become more perfect and those who are
not perfect are aborted. One can therefore expect an increase in the num-
ber of parents who will attempt to instruct physicians not to treat a seri-
ously handicapped child. As one expert has stated: "[m]ost parents in our
society if given the choice would prefer abortion of an affected fetus to a
sick child who requires any but the most trivial treatment. The prefer-
ence is likely to become more definite with rapidly changing attitudes to
abortion at a time when the low risks of amniocentesis will become fully
established and when simple abortion techniques become available." 2 '
Since abortion of the defective fetus is so widely accepted in our soci-
ety we find it less difficult to withdraw medical care from handicapped
children. Indeed, once the law recognizes the right to actively end the
human life of the defective unborn, the logic of such a utilitarian ethic
will be difficult, if not impossible to control with regard to handicapped
newborns. Perhaps the best suggestion comes from Professor Robertson:
123 See Darling, supra note 118, at 13.
I2, Zuk, supra note 112, at 145.
122 Lazar & Orpet, Attitudes of Young Gifted Boys and Girls Toward Handicapped Indi-
viduals, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 489-90 (1972).
16 Fletcher, Attitudes Toward Defective Newborns, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 21, 27
(1974).
I'l Id. at 30.
128 Motulsky, Public Health and Long-Term Genetic Implications of Intra-Uterine Diag-
nosis and Selective Abortion, 7 BIRTH DEFECTS 31 (1971).
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If recognized by the courts or legislature, such criteria [to describe defective
characteristics] would represent a collective social judgment, rather than id-
iosyncratic choices of parents and committees, as to when social costs out-
weigh individual benefits. To achieve legislative consensus, the criteria for
death should necessarily be narrow, reaching only the extreme cases. Fur-
ther protection can be obtained by a procedure that insures that the re-
quired clinical findings are accurately assessed, for example, by certification
of two nonattending physicians before treatment is withheld.2 9
The most difficult problem is to restrict this criterion for death to the
extreme cases. 130 While proper legal procedures may minimize the risks to
others, the real danger is the outgrowth of measures which have already
been morally and legally accepted. In the final analysis, this is not a di-
rect problem of law, but of society's attitude toward handicapped human
life.
VIII. INCOMPETENT PATIENTS: THE LEGAL STANDARDS
Euthanasia and the Right to Die
As we have seen, it is difficult to speak of "euthanasia"-whether ac-
tive or passive or voluntary or involuntary-because the term is difficult
to define. An essential connotation of "euthanasia" is that people who
have the option of choosing life choose death. In the words of Arthur
Dyck, it is not euthanasia when a person "does not choose death but how
to live while dying."'' 1 Some have termed this "voluntary passive eutha-
nasia," but this terminology should be avoided because of possible confu-
sion with other uses of the term. When the dying process has become
medically irreversible, the issue is not whether medical treatment should
be continued, since it is useless, but how best to aid and comfort an indi-
vidual while he is dying. The choice, while limited, is a choice for life, not
for death, since the patient chooses to live in the best way possible. This
distinction simplifies the work of the decision-maker, and leads to a two-
fold procedure, involving a medical prognosis and the consent of the doc-
tor and family.
In cases when there is no next of kin and the patient has expressed
no preferences, a court hearing and appointment of a guardian is in order,
since some form of consent is necessary to ensure due process. This pro-
cedure precludes the decision-maker's involvement with the arbitrary
"quality of life" concept. The essential question, which only our society
129 Robertson, supra note 107, at 266.
30 See McCormick, To Save or Let Die-The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 229 J.A.M.A.
172, 173 (1975).
131 Dyck, An Alternative to the Ethics of Euthanasia, in To LIVE AND To LET DIE 105 (R.
William. ed. 1973).
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can answer, is a moral one-is it ever wrong to choose death? In a context
of the inevitability of death, the interests of the state substantially dimin-
ish and the interests of the individual grow. The privacy interest-that
which determines one's destiny in the face of death-becomes very strong
and the state's interest in preventing suicide and defending innocent life
weakens. Thus, the moral and legal context dovetail.
In our present discussion, death is not directly chosen, although a
medical determination is made whether any medical intervention will
forestall death, provide remission, or cure. If it is determined that any
medical intervention is useless, we may morally and legally omit these
procedures except to the degree that they aid and comfort the patient in
living well while dying. A competent individual may himself choose to
forego the medical procedures which prolong his dying, and a family or
guardian may do so for an incompetent patient. Death is not caused by
this omission or the removal of machines, but rather by the disease itself.
It is entirely misleading to call this passive euthanasia, since it is no
longer possible to rescue the sick person. We must, therefore, comfort the
dying. This should be the basic principle in deciding whether or not to
remove life sustaining technology from the patient.188 Once such criteria
are established, case-by-case judicial intervention would be unnecessary.
These criteria direct our attention to the objective condition of the
patient, rather than the subjective wishes of family, doctors, "spiritual"
leaders, or judges. 183 While there may be some margin of error and uncer-
tainty, this is an objective medical determination. A court may therefore
enter appropriate orders in the best interests of an incompetent. Court
intervention would also be necessary in instances when there is a differ-
ence of opinion between physician and family, or when the patient is
mentally deficient, although not comatose, and the medical procedure
would prolong life for only a short time.
Under this standard, all required treatment could be ordered and ad-
ministered by the court for the terminally incompetent. This may be
done because the court represents the person of the incompetent. There
will be cases in which these medical interventions will help, while in
others, there will be no response to intervention. In the former, treatment
will be ordered since the presumption should be to favor life when the
patient has no capacity to participate in the decision affecting his life and
death. When it is determined that the situation is hopeless, treatment
should cease and comforting should begin. At this point, all medical tech-
nology can morally and legally be removed, except as to that treatment
which may be conducive to the comfort of the patient, thereby permitting
131 See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 26, 355 A.2d 647, 655.
'3 But see Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434
(Mass. 1977).
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the inexorable process of the disease to take its course. Cases will arise
wherein a factual determination must be made. In such instances, courts
should heed the advice of theologians, ethics committees and the like, so
that a truly wise and personal decision can be made. In Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz the court stated:
[T]he probate judge may, at any step in these proceedings, avail himself or
herself of the additional advice or knowledge of any person or group. We
note here that many health care institutions have developed medical ethics
committees or panels to consider many of the issues touched on here. Con-
sideration of the findings and advice of such groups as well as the testimony
of the attending physicians and other medical experts ordinarily would be
of great assistance to a probate judge faced with such a difficult decision.
We believe it desirable for a judge to consider such views wherever available
and useful to the court."8 '
If the starting point of the inquiry is the necessity of medical treatment,
the task of the court will be reasonable and sensible.
IX. QUINLAN, SAIKSwIcz AND SPRING
The Quinlan Decision
The legal standard adopted by the Quinlan court, that of cognitive
and sapient life, satisfies the objective standard of the medical indication
test discussed above. The facts in Quinlan indicated that no known medi-
cal treatment would have been of any use to Karen Quinlan. The medical
technology therefore only prolonged her dying and should have been dis-
continued on that basis alone, provided the proper consent of physician
and family was present. It was not necessary for the court to discuss and
approve the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary measures,
which is itself a continually shifting legal standard. The case of the dying,
comatose incompetent should always be carefully distinguished from
other situations involving the potential termination of treatment. In these
cases, if life-sustaining treatment is ordered withdrawn, there is abso-
lutely no intent to kill, but rather the wish that life be unencumbered by
useless and meaningless machines, tubes, and medications. Such a person
dies through the instrumentality of the disease, not through the instru-
mentality of a human agent.
Karen Quinlan was a dying, incompetent patient.18 8 If the court had
simply applied the standard already discussed, which in fact it finally did,
the intricate and confusing distinction between ordinary and extraordi-
nary medical interventions and the presumed and imputed exercise of the
134 Id.
136 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 22-27, 355 A.2d 647, 653-55.
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right of privacy would have been unnecessary. However, the court's dis-
cussion resulted in needless confusion. Indeed, the opinion possesses a
dangerous tenor. Further, by making Karen Quinlan's cognitive and sapi-
ent state the gravamen of its decision, the court has introduced, at least
sub silentio, a quality of life legal standard which may have dangerous
results when applied to other categories of human beings having low de-
grees of cognitive life. Indeed, the Quinlan court imputed a will to die to
the comatose patient, thereby permitting the guardian to take the neces-
sary measures to remove the life-sustaining machinery. The decision,
therefore, authorized others to bring about the death of a human being
based upon the tenuous assumption of an imputed desire to die. This is a
dangerous legal standard, since the distinction between voluntary and in-
voluntary euthanasia is weakened. The Quinlan decision, therefore, ap-
proaches involuntary euthanasia by allowing consent to be imputed to an
unwilling and nonconsenting patient.18 6
These confusing and dangerous legal standards could be avoided by
the application of a medical indication standard. Thus, when the patient
is in a situation where further curative efforts are useless, he should be
allowed to live as well and as comfortably as possible while he dies. This
is a medical determination since doctors can, within certain limits, ascer-
tain whether such a condition exists. It is also a legal determination, be-
cause protective procedures in an adversary process are employed to pro-
tect the interests of the dying incompetent. Death, which comes to all,
must eventually be accepted. The words of George Annas are appropriate
in this context:
The opinion should stand as a monument illustrating how far a court will go
to encourage physicians to do what it wants them to do in a particular case.
Its looseness of language and potential for abuse demand to be exposed and
discussed. Above all, it should be limited to the facts of this case and not
imposed on other patients whose rights it may destroy rather than
protect." "'
The Saikewicz Case
Joseph Saikewicz, a sixty-six year old man was profoundly retarded,
with an IQ of below 25.'8 Since his mental age was less than three years,
he was institutionalized all his life. While he was able to communicate by
gestures, he could not do so verbally.189 In April 1976, he was discovered
13 See generally, Riga, Euthanasia, the Right to Die and the Karen Quinlan Case, 11 BEV-
ERLY HILLS BAR A. J. 15, 27-28 (1977).
,s Annas, supra note 121, at 31.
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
19 For further factual development, see Brant, The Right to Die in Peace: Substituted
Consent and the Mentally Incompetent, 11 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 959 (1977).
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to have acute myeloblastic monoceltic leukemia, a fatal disease. The only
known treatment for the disease is chemotherapy, offering a thirty to fifty
percent remission possibility, which is limited to from three to thirteen
months. The treatment has serious side effects, including pain, discom-
fort, and in some cases, death. Physical restraints would have to be used
on Mr. Saikewicz, because he was not capable of understanding the rea-
son for the treatment. If he were to be untreated, he would live for some
weeks or months, after which he would probably die without pain. The
case presented an example of an incompetent who might be helped by a
medical procedure, and was therefore distinguishable from Quinlan.
One week after the diagnosis, the Superintendent of the Institute of
Belchertown petitioned the Massachusetts Probate Court for a guardian
to make necessary decisions for the care of Mr. Saikewicz. The court ap-
pointed a guardian ad litem. At the hearing, two physicians testified
against treatment, and the judge ordered that no treatment be given. His
order was based on findings that the factors favoring treatment, including
the possibility of an extended life expectancy and the fact that most pa-
tient's do choose treatment, were outweighed by the factors against, such
as the patient's age, incapability to cooperate, the side effects, and the
low probability of remission.
An immediate appeal was taken to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, which affirmed the ruling of the probate judge. On Sep-
tember 4, 1977, Mr. Saikewicz died of bronchial pneumonia, without ap-
parent pain. The Massachusetts Supreme Court then issued its full deci-
sion, discussing the major issues surrounding the treatment of dying,
incompetent patients. Although clearer than Quinlan, it concludes with
an implicit quality of life argument for denial of treatment.
The differences between Saikewicz and Quinlan are immediately ap-
parent. The "cognitive and sapient life" of Saikewicz was the same before
and during his illness. The decision of the lower Saikewicz court consid-
ered the patient's retardation when it discussed its own "quality of life"
argument against treatment. It appears that the very condition of Mr.
Saikewicz was used by the court as an argument against his being treated.
The decision of the probate court was, therefore, not a purely medical
decision, since the quality of life argument was utilized.
This quality of life view was adopted by the examining doctors.140 In
fact, both physicians testified that if Mr. Saikewicz were competent, they
would offer him the choice of accepting chemotherapy. All parties stipu-
lated to the fact that the vast majority of competent patients do in fact
accept chemotherapy. The court, however, used a subjective standard of
140 Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 48, Jones v. Saikewicz, No. 711 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.
July 9, 1976) [hereinafter cited as "Appendix"].
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substituted consent:
In short, the decision in cases such as this should be that which would be
made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking
into account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one
of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making pro-
cess of the competent person.141
The decision is premised on the probability that Mr. Saikewicz would
refuse treatment because he would see himself as retarded, and conclude
that his life was not worth living. The court thereby imposes its quality of
life view upon Mr. Saikewicz. This circulus vitiosus is compounded by
the fact that a child of three years could not understand the meaning of
suffering, who would have to be restrained during treatment, who would
suffer the same side effects and experience the same possibility of remis-
sion, would simply not be denied chemotherapy. If it is argued that the
cases are distinguishable because the three year old child's mental age
will develop, the quality of life argument, which the court sought to deny,
is conceded. 142 The Saikewicz brief aptly indicated that the fundamental
reason for non-treatment was a condition for which Saikewicz is in no
way responsible:
[Flailure to provide Mr. Saikewicz with chemotherapy may be in violation
of his constitutional right to treatment. Similarly, to deny Mr. Saikewicz
treatment, which a majority of competent patients choose, on the grounds
of the quality of life that Mr. Saikewicz would lead under chemotherapy
(the quality of life being judged to be so poor on the basis of his retarda-
tion) may violate Mr. Saikewicz's right to equal protection under the law." 3
The court's analysis of the argument for substituted consent is con-
fronted by the impossible task of attributing to the patient that which
simply cannot be discovered. Since this was not a question of a dying
non-competent patient for whom no medical treatment would help, the
added element in the decision must be the mental condition of Mr.
Saikewicz. If his life were extended by the treatment, he would continue
an impaired cognitive life. It was erroneous, therefore, for the Saikewicz
Court to analogize to the Quinlan case, since the fact situations were rad-
ically different. In Quinlan, the hopelessness of any curative medical pro-
cedure had to be resolved, while in Saikewicz, the medical indication was
clear both from the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. It was the probate
court's finding that most normal patients who suffer from the same dis-
ease choose chemotherapy. This was regarded as a clear indication of how
141 370 N.E.2d at 431.
'o, Id. at 432.
"' Appendix, supra note 140, at 24. Nowhere does the court make reference to this argu-
ment in its opinion.
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Mr. Saikewicz would choose it if he were capable of doing so.
When the patient has not expressed an opinion on these matters, the
criteria for substituted consent must be objective, and must contemplate
what most people would do under the same circumstances. Any other test
is simply an arbitrary stipulation which permits the decision-maker to
introduce and give weight to his own weltanschaung. It is submitted,
therefore, that the quality of life criteria should not have been adopted.
Although the Massachusetts court held that the right of privacy can be
asserted for an incompetent by an impartial court in an adversarial pro-
ceeding, it set aside the traditional standard used for a "normal" child or
patient, and replaced it with subjective criteria, treating Saikewicz as if
he were a competent patient who would then "reasonably" take into ac-
count the fact that he was incompetent. The court apparently turned the
objective criterion for incompetence-what most people in the same con-
dition would choose-into a subjective criterion by the miracule dictu of
the impossible. The door is not open to all forms of abuse, in determining
the fate of incompetents who would perhaps choose not to live if they had
knowledge of their incompetence as determined by the rational and ob-
jective decisionmaker. There is every reason to believe that this legal
standard will follow the logical route of its development. The Saikewicz
court explained:
Individual choice is determined not by the vote of the majority but by the
complexities of the singular situation viewed from the unique perspective of
the person called on to make the decision. To presume that the incompetent
person must always be subjected to what many rational and intelligent per-
sons may decline is to downgrade the status of the incompetent person by
placing a lesser value on his intrinsic human worth and vitality. "
The substitution of judgment standard was originally enunciated to
guard the dignity and worth of the incompetent in the name of objectiv-
ity. The court frustrates this purpose for one reason: the mental condition
of Mr. Saikewicz. Informed consent for the incompetent should receive
every protection, both procedurally and substantively, so as to prevent, as
much as possible, the personal prejudices and philosophy of the decision-
maker from being imposed on the incompetent in the name of dignity
and personal worth.
The criterion used by the court may nonetheless be understood in an
objective manner. It is true that the majority of "normal" people in the
same situation as Mr. Saikewicz would choose chemotherapy. The ques-
tion we have raised asks whether the court should deny what the majority
of normal people in similar circumstances would choose. This is depen-
dent, at least indirectly, upon a quality of life determination by the court.
141 370 N.E.2d at 482.
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In the case of conscious, mentally competent people, the human meaning
of their choice for chemotherapy is a continuation, even for a few months,
of an effectively human conscious existence whose choice was freely made.
In the case of Mr. Saikewicz, however, this objective human meaning of
choice is not and cannot be present. In fact, as the court recognizes, Mr.
Saikewicz would not even understand the reason for the additional pain
and suffering which such a procedure would entail. A continuation of this
state would therefore have little human meaning. In this light, the situa-
tion presented by Saikewicz may be distinguished from that of Quinlan.
It therefore cannot be said that the standard used by both courts was
purely subjective. At the same time, substituted judgment remains a form
of judicial fantasy which, although perhaps necessary, should remain ob-
jectively based.
The Spring Case
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently decided a case
in which it sought to clarify Saikewicz. In In re Spring,'" the court ap-
proved the removal of seventy-eight year old Mr. Spring from kidney di-
alysis. The probate court decision was in response to an application from
his wife and son. A final opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
issued approximately one month after Mr. Spring died, stated that
"[little need be said about criminal liability: there is precious little prec-
edent, and what there is suggests that the doctor will be protected if he
acts on a good faith judgment that is not grievously unreasonable by
medical standards. ' ' 14 6 The most disturbing aspect of this case is the
court's broad language concerning the quality of life of nursing home pa-
tients such as Mr. Spring. The court concluded that Mr. Spring "would, if
competent, choose not to receive the life-prolonging treatment,"'"" and
dismissed any reference to the quality of life standard, contending that
"[the problem of impairment of 'quality of life' associated with
Saikewicz's mental retardation has no analogue in the present case."
'
"
4 8
The facts in Spring, however, like Saikewicz, do reveal "quality of
life" considerations. Mr. Spring himself had never stated any preferences
regarding medical treatment should he become incompetent. Evidence
was adduced that while Mr. Spring was alive, he led a vigorous, active
life." The decision was necessarily based on what others-the family and
court-think Mr. Spring would have wanted and was a clear example of
14 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980).
146 Id. at 112.
147 Id. at 122-23.
148 Id. at 123.
141 Id. at 122.
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substituted judgment. The court took the view that Mr. Spring's condi-
tion was "irreversible and incurable,"'16 but did not acknowledge that
this is true for all patients who suffer from chronic kidney failure and
who are not candidates for transplantation.
Application of the court's analysis to senile persons is even more dis-
turbing. By reasoning that "[t]he treatment did not cause a remission of
the disease or restore him even temporarily to a normal, cognitive, inte-
grated, functioning existence, but simply kept him alive,""15 the court rec-
ognized a broad standard, without legal precedent: if one is not and can-
not be returned to a normal, cognitive, integrated, functioning existence,
but can simply be kept alive, it is not required that one be kept alive.
This standard could be applied to a wide spectrum of the retarded, in-
cluding all senile persons in nursing homes.
The Quinlan standard, it should be noted, was narrower. If the fam-
ily, physician, and a hospital ethics committee all agreed that "there is no
reasonable possibility of returning to a cognitive, sapient state," then life-
supporting measures could be withdrawn without legal liability. This in
itself is a type of "brain death" definition. It narrowly defines a category
of patients who need not be treated, and thus is a safer and more precise
criterion for treating such patients.
Since the Massachusetts court's standard is overly broad, it would be
preferable to adhere to the more narrow standard of the Quinlan court,
which incorporated the medical prognosis test. Application of this crite-
rion would be unencumbered by complicated judicial intervention. The
notion of "substituted judgment" in a case where the patient has ex-
pressed no desire as to treatment must be recognized as a retreat to fan-
tasy. The criteria relied on by the Quinlan court are humane, efficient,
and respectful of privacy. Moreover, the standard enunciated in
Saikewicz and Spring are dangerous for large segments of the retarded
and senile, since the court is permitted to impose its own value judgment.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether to treat, continue to treat, or to remove cur-
ative means from a dying incompetent must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. The medical profession alone can determine whether further
curative methods will be of any help. The family should be listened to
carefully in an effort to determine what the incompetent desired when
still competent. Spiritual and religious advice should also be sought. This
process need not be adversarial.
The person of the incompetent must vigorously be represented by a
o Id. at 118.
1' Id.
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guardian ad litem who will defend the basic right to life of the incompe-
tent. The role of the judge is not that of a new priesthood, but calls for a
determination of what is in the best interest of the incompetent. The le-
gal standard which the court employs must be objective in nature, predi-
cated on what most competent people elect to do under similar circum-
stances. There is no authority to speculate, fantasize, or impute decisions
to an incompetent. Every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of
prolonging the life of the incompetent. Judicial intervention should be
restricted to instances when there is no next of kin, when there is a dis-
pute between family members and the family physician, or when there is
evidence of malevolent motives or medical negligence.
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice152 provides insight into how we
should proceed in such cases. A theory of "justice as fairness" is pro-
posed, in which what ought to be done is determined by asking what we
would agree to if we did not know what role we would play in life. This
minimal demand of justice will insist on a procedure that will not be un-
reasonably delayed, that will not distress one's family, and that-as much
as the human state of fallibility allows-will safeguard the right to decide
whether to struggle for yet another morning or slip gently into the night.
J' j. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15-28 (1971).
